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O

STREmT in Albany stately marble pillars flank
the entrance to Court of Appeals Hall. Here, from the
dramatically hand-carved bench in one of the most handsome
courtrooms in the nation, the seven judges of the New York
Court of Appeals dispense the ultimate decisional law of the
state. Sometimes in startling, thunderbolt fashion, more
often in a less-exciting, subtle manner, but always, these decisions make and shape the legal principles that govern every
phase of New York's vastly complex activities. Even legislative pronouncements are not immune from the pervading
authority of New York's highest judicial tribunal which,
albeit within narrow confines, holds the power of life and
death over the acts of the legislature.
But despite its obvious position of paramount importance in New York's judicial structure, the actual workings
of this court, the essential mechanics of its decisional process,
even the broad outlines of its jurisdiction, are little known
and less understood. To many lawyers, Court of Appeals
decisions are born in the advance sheet; they are discovered
there by the attorney in much the same fashion that Moses
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was discovered on the river bank by Pharaoh's daughter.
Their parentage and the circumstances of their origin are a
mystery.
This ignorance of the work of the Court of Appeals
is explicable. Only a small percentage of the Bar ever
comes in personal contact with the court and even fewer
are ever exposed to the actual method of its decision-making.
Moreover, although recently there has been a quickened public interest in the makeup and modus opertandi of the
Supreme Court of the United States and a consequent rash
of printed material about that body,' the processes of our
own Court of Appeals have gone virtually unpublicized.
A description of the mechanical processes of the court,
therefore, even the meagre sketch offered here, may be of
some value. Possibly, it will help give a new dimension to
the decisions and opinions of the court which in one manner
or another, mediately or immediately, affect most lawyers
daily. If it serves no important practical purpose it may
at least satisfy what should be a natural curiosity about the
work of New York's highest judicial body.
JuRIsmTIoN o

THE COURT

OF

APPEALS IN BROAD

OumINEM

Any discussion of the work done by the Court of Appeals
must be prefaced with a description, no matter how brief, of
its jurisdiction.
Few areas of our law are plagued with the sort of vexing
conundrums that are encountered with such distressing frequency in a study of Court of Appeals jurisdiction. Although
susceptible of broad outlining, the constitutional and statutory definitions that prescribe and circumscribe review in
New York's highest court achieve enormous complexity in
their application. 2
1 See, e.g., Lewis, How the Supreme Court Reaches Decisions, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 1, 1957 (Magazine), p. 51; The Bright Young Men Behind the Bench,

U.S. News & World Report, July 12, 1957, p. 45.

2Unquestionably the single most authoritative work on Court of Appeals
jurisdiction is COHEN & KARGER, POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS
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As originally conceived and as presently constituted, the
Court of Appeals' main function is to settle the law administered by the separate, and sometimes discordant, intermediate appellate courts.3 The details of its jurisdictional
provisions are largely the product of progressive attempts at
supplying strictures on what was at one time an immensely
unworkable volume of appeals.4 By 1925 the formulation of
these limitations had reached a stage which has remained
comparatively static since then. These last most significant
restrictions were proposed in the Constitutional Convention
of 1921 r and written into the law in 1925 as Article VI,
Section 7 of the New York Constitution.6
In its present form the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals is purely appellate. 7 Two broad classes of cases are
appealable. The first are those which are received only by
permission, either of the court itself (in the same manner
that the United States Supreme Court grants writs of
certiorari) or by permission of the Appellate Division, and
the second are those cases which are thrust upon the Court
of Appeals as a matter of right."
These two classes of appeals are described with some
precision in the Civil Practice Act.9
The type of case most frequently before the Court of
Appeals is the appeal as a matter of right in a civil case
from a final determination of the Appellate Division, which
determination involved either a reversal, modification or
(rev. ed. 1952).

Both of the authors spent extended periods of time as

law secretaries in the court. Their work is a remarkably thorough and competent treatment of this very intricate area of law.

It is not infrequently

cited by the court in its opinions.
3 See 2 REsVIED REcoRD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
898 (1900).
4 COHEN & KARGER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 7, at 29.

CONVENTION

OF

1894

5 See LEG. Doe. No. 37, at 19-20 (1922).

6N.Y. Sess. Laws 1926, ch. 725 amended N.Y. Crv. P-Ac. Act §§ 588-89
to conform to the changes made in the constitution.
7 By virtue of N.Y. JUDCIARy LAw § 53, the Court of Appeals does have
rule making power in connection with admission to the Bar.
8 The word "thrust" is used advisedly; the great number of affirmances
without opinion in appeals that come to the Court of Appeals as a matter
of right indicates that many of the cases which are appealed by virtue of this

absolute prerogative would be refused by the court if it had the power to
do so. COHEN & KARGER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 7, at 31.
9 N.Y. Civ. Pi-c. AcT §§ 588-90.
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dissent.10 With relatively few exceptions the remainder of
the cases found on the court calendar are appeals by permission of the Court of Appeals or Appellate Division. 1
In criminal cases, other than capital, appeal lies to the
Court of Appeals only by permission granted either by a
judge of the Court of Appeals or a justice of the Appellate
Division. 1 2 Where the death penalty has been imposed the
constitution of the state provides for appeal as a matter of3
right directly to the Court of Appeals from the trial court.'
These are the general provisions describing appealability.
As noted, their application to particular fact patterns can
present formidable difficulties. More than one ulcer has
been nourished by the anguishing task of determining
whether an order or judgment is "final" within the meaning
of the constitution; whether the determination constitutes
a "modification," and whether the party appealing has
"standing." 14
The confusion created by some questions of "appealability," i.e., whether a case can properly be put before
the Court of Appeals, is compounded by a second jurisdictional aspect. Assuming an appeal is properly lodged in
the Court of Appeals a question remains as to its "reviewability," i.e., the nature and scope of the issues which the
court is empowered to consider and affect.
Basically, the Court of Appeals is a court of law and
not of fact. By constitutional prescription the jurisdiction
of the court is limited to the review of questions of law
except for narrowly defined exceptions. Where the death
10 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 588.

11 In the court year commencing July 1, 1958 and ending June 30, 1959 the
Court of Appeals decided 383 cases. 180 had as the basis of their jurisdiction
a reversal, modification or dissent in the Appellate Division. 173 were appeals
by permission. 5 N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFER.NCE ANN. REP. 159 (1960).
12 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 520(3).
"3N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 7; N.Y. CODE Calm. PRoc. §§ 517-20.
14 A particularly striking example of the sort of problems confronted is
supplied by the recent case of Baidach v. Togut, 7 N.Y.2d 128, 164 N.E.2d 373
196 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1959). In the Baidach case appellant survived a preliminary
motion to dismiss his appeal as of right on the ground that the determination
of the Appellate Division did not constitute a modification [6 N.Y.2d 996,
161 N.E.2d 753, 191 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1959)] only to have his appeal dismissed
after argument of the cause on the merits because he did not have standing.
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penalty has been decreed in a criminal case or where the
Appellate Division on reversing or modifying finds new facts,
the Court of Appeals may inquire into the evidence and make
its own determination as to the facts.11 The omnipresent
difficulty with these provisions is the virtual impossibility
of predicting what will be considered a question of fact as
distinguished from a matter of law. Aside from the simplest
illustration, the case in which opposing witnesses give conflicting and not inherently incredible testimony thereby
giving rise to a question of fact,16 no general formulae are
available. Determinations are made by the court 7on a purely
ad hoc basis, sometimes with perplexing results.
MOTIONS FOR LuAVE To APPEAL: THEIR SIGNIFICANO

The Court of Appeals spends a considerable part of its
time deciding which cases to decide. Beginning in early
September and continuously throughout the year the court
receives and passes upon hundreds of requests for permission
to appeal from decisions in lower tribunals. These motions
' 5 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 7; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 605.
16 See, e.g., Sadowski v. Long Island R.R., 292 N.Y. 448, 55 N.E.2d 497
(1944).
17 At times the courts themselves lose hold of the slippery distinctions in
this area. An illustration of this is found in the fascinating history of the
case of Sagorsky v. Malyon, 283 App. Div. 859, 129 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1st Dep't
1954) (memorandum decision), rev'd, 307 N.Y. 584, 123 N.E.2d 79 (1954)
(per curiam). On the first trial a plaintiff's verdict was returned in this
action on an insurance policy. The Appellate Division, First Department,
holding that the verdict was "against the weight of the evidence," reversed
the trial court and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed,
stating that since the Appellate Division had found that the verdict was
"against the weight of the evidence' it could not dismiss the complaint but
was compelled to order a new trial. On the second trial [2 App. Div.2d 675,
153 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1st Dep't 1956) (memorandum decision), rer7d, 3 N.Y.2d
907, 145 N.E.2d 871, 167 N.Y.S.2d 926 (1957) (per curiam)] a plaintiff's verdict
was again returned. This time it was set aside and the complaint dismissed
by the trial court on motion. The Appellate Division affirmed this determination only to be again reversed by the Court of Appeals. On this second review of the case the Court of Appeals said that the evidence contained a
question of fact which precluded dismissal. The matter was remitted to the
Appellate Division. Confronted with the case for the third time the Appellate
Division conceded that it had earlier been in error, then promptly ordered a
new trial on a question not theretofore considered on the appeal; the propriety
of the trial judge's charge [4 App. Div.2d 1016, 490 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1st Dep't
1957) ]. By this time the litigants, exhausted from their frantic flights up and
down the judicial ladder, succumbed to the apparent futility of the chase, and
settled out of court.
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are by court rule non-arguable 18 and their disposition is
rarely attended by anything more than a short entry. 19 It
would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the treatment
of these applications occupies a relatively unimportant position in the schedule of court work. Although the review of
such motions is necessarily less intensive than the review on
appeal, they are afforded the same solemn consideration that
is devoted to every matter before the court. As in the case
of appeals each judge of the court receives and studies copies
of the briefs on the motion 20 and each judge votes on its
disposition.
For all practical purposes the question as to whether
leave to appeal should be granted in a particular case which
presents a legal issue is completely within the discretion of
the Court of Appeals. The statutory provisions governing
motions for leave to appeal offer no criteria for the exercise
of judgment in this area other than the traditional injunction that the "interest of substantial justice be served." 21
To a considerable extent, the sort of case in which permission will be granted depends upon the court's current
conception of its underlying function and purpose. At a
time in the past when the court regarded itself solely as a
court for the harmonizing, clarifying and settling of legal
principles, 22 the acceptability of cases for review was tested
against that measuring rod. Thus, in 1896 a unanimous
Court of Appeals speaking through the opinion of Chief Judge
Andrews stated:
[T]he right reserved to apply to the court or a judge to allow an
appeal, was intended primarily to provide for exceptional cases where
Is N.Y.

CT. App. R. XXI.

19 But see Sciolina v. Erie Preserving Co., 151 N.Y. 50, 45 N.E. 371 (1896).
20 The motion papers consist of eighteen printed copies of the briefs and

affidavits and one copy of the record below. The reason for requiring only
one copy of the record is the obvious economic one. In order to avoid the
possibility that an unsuccessful applicant will have unnecessarily incurred
the considerable expense of printing new records on appeal for the purpose
of the motion, the court assumes for itself the inconvenience of circulating
one record among seven judges. N.Y. CT. APP. R. XXI.
21 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 589(4) (a).
22 2 REVISED RECORD OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF

1894 893 (1900).
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public interests or the interest of jurisprudence might be endangered
by permitting a decision to go unchallenged .... 23
The attitude of the Court of Appeals has altered with
the passage of time. The nature of this change is concisely
described by Cohen and Karger:
But the underlying conception of the function of the Court of Appeals
has changed since these principles were laid down. Until 1925 the
Court did not sit to correct errors in particular determinations. It
was closely restricted to the function of laying down principles
for the guidance of the courts below. Today the Court is truly an
appellate court. It has, in addition to its earlier powers, the duty to
see justice done in every case no matter how brought before it ....
It seems safe to say [today] that a party moving for leave to appeal
will ordinarily be successful if he can show reversible error in the
determination below, regardless of the breadth or importance of the
question presented. As a practical matter, the Court does not overstep its proper function if it grants leave to appeal in any case where
examination . . . discloses probable error. 24
Of course, the considerations that might induce the
granting of leave to appeal set out by Judge Andrews have
by no means been diminished in significance by the court's
broadened conception of its jurisdiction. They have merely
been complemented. Today, as in 1896, if the case is affected
with a broad public interest or extensive legal significance,
the chances of receiving permission to appeal are excellent.
Although the existence of probable error below will
prompt today's Court of Appeals to grant leave to appeal,
the granting of leave is by no means a reliable indication of
an eventual reversal. Indeed, the statistics speak quite eloquently to the contrary.2 5
Upon analysis, these statistics are something less than
startling. Reasons, other than a desire to correct a presumably erroneous determination below, may conduce to the
23 Sciolina v. Erie Preserving Co., sapra note 19, at 53, 45 N.E. 371 at 372
(1896).
24 COHEN & KARGER, op. cit. supra note 2, § 82, at 355.
25

Of the 104 cases appealed by permission of the Court of Appeals in the

1958-59 court year only 25% (26) eventuated in reversals.
CONFERENCE ANN. REP. 159 (1960).

5 N.Y.

JUDIcIAL

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 34

grant of permission. Cases may be let up for review because
of a discrepancy in the Appellate Division or because the
matter is one of first impression on which the Court of
Appeals desires to write.2 6 Another factor contributes to and
helps explain the small percentage of eventual reversals in
cases appealed by permission of the court. By virtue of an
informal rule of practice, it is possible for a party to receive
leave to appeal where only two of the seven judges actually
consider the case worthy of review. By time-honored tradition the rest of the court will accede if two judges request
that permission be granted. Upon the vote of these two the
remaining judges formally concur with the result that the
motion is granted unanimously. As a practical consequence
cases can be-and have been-let up on the sole ground of
probable error where five judges of the court are convinced
that the decision below is a correct one. If the majority remains unpersuaded by appellant's additional brief and oral
argument when the case is reached, the result is, of course,
an affirmance.
On the other hand, denial of a motion for leave to appeal
bears a less ambiguous significance. In view of the fact that
a finding of probable error by the court below will ordinarily
result in the grant of leave to appeal, it is fairly inferable
from a refusal to grant permission that the court thereby
confirms the propriety of the decision below.2 7 This inference
has force only as a practical judgment as to the significance
of the court's disposition of the motion. It is by no means
binding upon the courts. 8
26 See, e.g., People v. Carroll, 3 N.Y.2d 686, 148 N.E2d 875, 177 N.Y.S.2d

812 (1958).

27 In Bednarsh v. Cohen, 292 N.Y. 578, 54 N.E.2d 693, (1944) (per curiam),
an election law case, the motion for leave was denied "without consideration
of the questions of law which the appellants seek to present, on the ground
that a motion for leave to appeal made at this time should as a matter of
public policy be denied." Id. at 579, 54 N.E.2nd at 694. The fact that the
Court apparently felt constrained to disavow any judgment on the merits of the
law points raised by the motion, lends some sapport to the conclusion reached
above.
28 Marchant v. Mead Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386
(1929), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 808 (1930).
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DECISION OF AN APPEAL,-THE MDTHOD

If permission to appeal is granted, or the decision below
is appealable as a matter of right, the mechanical task of
bringing the case before the Court of Appeals is relatively
trouble-free. Although the various pertinent statutes and
rules present, on first reading, a rather confused description
of the procedure, 29 with the aid of a competent printer and
the ever-available assistance of the fine Court of Appeals
Clerks' offices, the perfecting of an appeal presents no serious
problem.
Once the notice of appeal is timely served,30 appellant is relatively secure. In the Supreme Court of the
United States and some other federal and state courts, the
rules of procedure for the perfecting of appeals are selfexecuting. In many courts these rules hang over the head
of the litigant like the sword of Damocles and fall upon the
unfortunate who is late or has overlooked some technical
requirement with all the inexorable effect of a guillotine.
Not so in the Court of Appeals. Ample provision is made
for the avoidance of unnecessary delays, 3 1 but for the most
part the expeditious processing of appeals is managed without
recourse to anything stronger than a suggestion from the
clerk's office.32

29 See, e.g., N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. Acr §§ 575-76, 593; N.Y. CT. APP. R. I, IV,
V, VI, VII, XIX.
30 The limitations of time fixed by the statute are jurisdictional and inflexible. N.Y. Civ. PaAc. Acr § 592. An omission to file the notice of appeal
within the prescribed time is irremediably fatal to the appeal. See, e.g.,
N.Y. CiV. PRAc. Acr § 99; Lehman v. Rudin, 254 N.Y. 508, 173 N.E. 842
(1930) (memorandum decision); Pollack v. Port Morris Bank, 257 N.Y. 287,
177 N.E. 863 (1931) (per curiam); Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v.
Otis Elevator Co., 291 N.Y. 254, 52 N.E.2d 421 (1943) (per curiam).
3' See, e.g., N.Y. CT. APP. R. I; Steinberg v. Mealey, 296 N.Y. 614, 68
N.E.2d 887 (1946) (memorandum decision). See also N.Y. CT. App. R. VI,

VIi.

32 Much to the credit of the present court and its clerk's office, the calendar
is now under such excellent control as to permit counsel on an appeal to select
their own date for argument upon two weeks' notice before the commencement of the court session. This is particularly notable in light of the heavy
work load of cases and motions shouldered by the present court. See 5 N.Y.

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ANN. REP. 159 (1960).
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The case comes to the Court of Appeals in the form of a
record on appeal and written argument or brief.33
The importance of these written arguments can hardly
be gainsaid. Although the court is by no means confined to
the law supplied in the briefs, a good brief will assure that
no pertinent principle of law or consideration of policy
escapes the attention of the judges. For the most part, the
briefs submitted in recent years have been adequate by court
standards. But not an inconsiderable number of them leave
much to be desired. Particularly vexing to the court is the
written argument that is traitor to its name; a prolix,
rambling collection of pertinent law and banal generalities
that pretends to be a "brief." One harried judge of the
court described just such a brief-a sixty-seven page argument by appellant in a relatively uncomplicated contract case
-as an attempt at "persuasion by inundation." The method
3 4
is not recommended.
Once the record and briefs have been filed the case is
ready for consideration by the court.
THE ROTATION SYSTRM
At the very heart of the decisional method employed by

the Court of Appeals is the traditional system whereby each
appeal becomes the special charge of one of the seven judges
of the court.

The system is a practical necessity dictated

33 N.Y. CT. App. R. VII provides for eighteen printed copies of the record
and briefs. Each of the seven judges receives copies. The rest are distributed,
after the case has been decided, to various law libraries throughout the state.
Provision is made for appeal in forma pauperis, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 558.
See People v. Pride, 3 N.Y.2d 545, 549, 147 N.E.2d 719, 721, 170 N.Y.S.2d
321, 324 (1958).
34 Appellant was unsuccessful. The brief referred to amounted to little
more than a punctuation mark in comparison with the arguments filed in the
famous case of Willett v. Herrick, 258 Mass. 585, 155 N.E. 589, cert. denied,
275 U.S. 545 (1927). In an historically herculean effort by both sides, 1,595
pages of brief (printed quarto size paper) were filed for appellants and 1,107

for appellee.
There is no prescribed form of brief for the Court of Appeals. The Rules
provide only for the mode of printing. N.Y. CT. App. R. V. Excellent suggestions for the writing of briefs appropriate in the Court of Appeals have
been published in recent years. See, e.g., Mattison, The Appellate Brief,
8 FEDERATION OF INS. COUN. 66, 72 (Summer 1958) ; RE, BRIEF WRITING AND
ORAL ARGUMENT

(2d ed. 1957).
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by the court's huge volume of work. In the 1958-59 court
year 1,020 cases and motions were decided.3" Some 1,000
records and twice that number of briefs were submitted for
consideration. No doubt many of these matters, because of
jurisdictional defects or the sheer simplicity of the questions
presented, were quickly processed. The vast bulk of them,
however, required extensive study, analysis, research and
consultation. Even if the court had worked seven days a
week throughout the entire court year, each judge would
have had to study, consider, vote on and perhaps write an
opinion in three cases (3 records and 6 or more briefs) a day
in order to keep up with the calendar. The rotation system
serves as a partial solution for this otherwise impossible
workload.
By virtue of this system only one judge undertakes the
initial responsibility of analyzing the record and briefs in
each case and reporting to the rest of the court his findings
and recommendation for disposition. Of course, his recommendation is by no means binding upon the court; his vote
is merely one of seven. Indeed, frequently when the final
count is taken after consultation the reporting judge finds
himself in the minority-if not alone.
The method used to determine which judge will undertake the primary obligation of analysis is a quaint but efficient one. Each day while the court is in session six or seven
cases appear on the calendar. The calendar is made up one
day in advance by the clerk's office. The numerical position on the calendar of the several cases is then determined
by drawing lots out of a hat.36 Starting on the first day of
the January session of court, the Chief Judge is assigned the
case which has drawn the number one position on the calendar for that day. The succeeding cases are assigned in
turn to the six other judges starting with the senior judge
in point of service on the court and descending to the junior
35 5 N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ANN. REP. 159 (1960).
36 The actual drawing of lots is done by the clerk of the court, Raymond
J. Cannon. Any system that leaves the numerical position of the cases purely
to chance would work as well as the one now used. The "hat" method was
adopted about five years ago during the tenure of Chief Judge Conway.
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judges.3 7 Throughout the year this rotation continues; each
day the lots are drawn to determine the numerical position
of the cases on the next day's calendar.3 8
In an ideal world the number of appeals before the court
would be sufficiently small so as to permit each judge to
afford each case the same intensive study that is made by
the reporting judge under the present system. But in an
ideal w6rld there would be no Court of Appeals. Within the
limitations of this imperfect world in which we must live, the
rotation system is a highly efficient and highly successful
mode of operation. It has the advantage of lightening the
onus of the court work without relieving any of the judges of
the decision-making responsibility. At the same time it
avoids the vice, inherent in the practice of some other appellate courts,3 9 of specialization. In a system where judges are
permitted to select their own cases or to refuse assignments,
and to a less marked extent in a system where assignments
are made by a Chief Judge, it is altogether possible that certain judges will attract specific, narrow, types of cases. This
specialization has a tendency toward "one man" decisions
and opinions which is obviously at variance with the true
40
purpose of a multiple judge bench.

THE IMPORTANCE) OF ORAL ARGUMENT

There has been for some time past a disagreement among
attorneys over the practical worth of oral argument of an
appeal. lany contend that as long as the argument has been
set out in the brief there is no point in consuming the time
and energies of both themselves and the bench by reiterating
7 On the present Court of Appeals the order of the judges, in point of
service with the court, is as follows: Chief Judge Desmond, Judge Dye (Senior
Judge), Judge Fuld, Judge Froessel, Judge Van Voorhis, Judge Burke and
Judge Foster (Junior Judge).
3 Motions for leave to appeal are assigned, in the order of their submission, to each judge in rotation. In the case of motions the rotation starts
with the Junior Judge in September and ascends to the Chief Judge.
39 For a brief description of the practice in the Supreme Court of the
United States and the highest courts in other states see WiENi.a, EFFECTIVE
APPELLATE ADvocAcY 11-45 (1950).
40 See Loughran, The Argument of An Appeal in The Court of Appeals,
12 FORDHAm L. Rav. 1, 3 (1943).
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their legal position orally.4 1 Coupled with this, usually, is
the assertion that courts themselves are less than anxious
to hear attorneys. For this latter contention no support
other than an undocumented illustration of an appeal court's
cavalier attitude regarding oral argument is ever offered.
It is indisputably the fact that most of the judges of
the Court of Appeals-indeed the majority of appellate judges
-encourage and look forward to oral argument as a valuable
aid to them in the decisional process.
The late Judge Loughran of the Court of Appeals, in
characteristically felicitous language, said this about oral
argument:
[T] he thought may arise whether an exhaustive brief really requires
the aid of oral presentation. Again the answer must be a personal
one. I know that I experience a feeling of distinct disappointment
when on the call of a case that falls to me, I hear the clerk say,
"Submitted." When the briefs in a submitted case are picked up at
the end of a day that has told heavily they are dead things. Under
those circumstances, it is hard for a judge not to feel a diminution
of his ardor. The printed word of the ablest advocate, to me at least,
falls far short of the same arguments when heard face to face through

his living voice.
The phrasing of my feeling in this aspect is difficult; but you
may take my word for it, oral address may breed an intimacy between advocate and judge that can never come out of a printed
page.

42

Judge Loughran's sentiments are typical. 43 Appellate
courts like the Court of Appeals are constantly faced with a
large, unabating case load often aggravated by briefs, which,
because of their diffuseness or lack of cogency, are more of
an obstacle to expeditious disposition than an aid. Under
these circumstances, any opportunity to isolate the signifi41 See Davis, The Argunent of An Appeal, 26 A.B.A.J. 895 (1940).
42

See note 40 supra.

43 See also Rossman, Appellate Court Advocacy: The Importance of Oral

.Argument, 45 A.B.A.J. 675 (1959); Jackson, Advocacy Before the Supreme
Court: Suggestions for Effective Case Presentations,37 A.B.A.J. 801 (1951);
Nebraska State Bar Ass'n-Proceedings of the Forty-FourthAnnual Meeting,
.22 NEB. L. REv. 5, 39, 43 (1943); HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNiTmi STATES 61-63 (lst ed. 1928).
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cant issues from all that is impertinent is recognized as
valuable. Oral argument presents just such an opportunity:
It is a great saving of time of the court, in the examination of extended records and briefs, to obtain the grasp of the case that is
made possible by oral discussion and to be able more quickly to
4
separate the wheat from the chaff. "
The importance of oral argument in the Court of
Appeals is increased by the fact that in this court the briefs
are seldom, if ever, read beforehand. 45 On occasion the court
brings to the argument some familiarity with the case, either
because of an extraordinary public interest that might
prompt the court to make a preliminary perusal or because
the case was earlier before the court on a motion for leave
to appeal. Almost always, however, the only information
the court has before the argument is a terse description of
the issues and principal points of counsel.4 6 Necessarily,
therefore, the impression created on oral argument must be
a "first" impression-and more importantly, a lasting one.
Despite the fact that there is usually a considerable interval of time between the argument of a case and the voting in conference, there can be little doubt that the impression created on the oral argument persists in the minds of
the judges until a decision is actually made. There is considerable and vivid evidence of this. In a survey made some
ten years ago the majority of appellate judges polled indicated that in most cases their impression at the close of the
oral arguments coincided with their final votes.4 7 Indeed,
it has been reported that one former Chief Judge of the Court
of Appeals had for a considerable period of time kept notes
of his reactions after argument and of his final votes and

44 HUGHES, op. cit. supra note 43, at 63.
45 See WIENER, EFFEcTIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY 18, n.39 (1950),

quoting
a letter from Hon. Bruce Bromley, Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals,
June 22, 1949. See also Loughran, The Arguments of an Appeal in the Court
of Appeals, 12 FORDHAm L. RBv. 1, 4 (1943).
46 Very brief abstracts on each case appearing on the next (lay's calendar
are prepared and distributed to the judges by a confidential clerk of the court
on the night preceding the arguments.
47 WIENER, op. cit. supra note 45, at 45.
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found that the two were identical in ninety-seven per cent of
the cases ! 4s
RoiD OF THE LAW SECREARY

After oral argument the judges of the court take up the
business of analysis of the cases argued and the preparation
of reports. At this stage of the decisional process the work
of the law secretary is first encountered.
The judges select their own secretaries. Ordinarily,
these young men are chosen from graduating classes of various law schools upon the basis of their academic excellence
and their experience in legal research and writing. More
often than not they are former editors of or contributors to
their school's law review.
The precise nature and extent of their work varies
with the individual judge but the basic duties of the various law secretaries are the same. In cases where written
reports are to be submitted, most judges have their secretaries
prepare preliminary summaries and analyses of the records
and briefs in the cases to which the judge has been assigned.
These preliminary reports are extremely comprehensive.
Extensive legal research is done, often reaching far beyond
the law supplied in the briefs of counsel. By the time the
secretary's report has been prepared and submitted to the
judge, the judge has already made an independent study of
the record and briefs. Long hours of discussion between
judge and his assistant may then follow. Principally, the
judge is interested in establishing the accuracy of the findings of the secretary as to the factual content of the record
and the state of the available pertinent law. When the judge
is satisfied, he uses the secretary's report-or what remains
of it-in the preparation of his own memorandum for the
court.

49

Ordinarily, the law secretary is also called upon to read
over and offer suggestions on the opinions written by his
judge. In this regard his function is much the same as that
48
49

Ibid.
A similar routine is followed in connection with motions.
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of the law assistant in the Supreme Court of the United
States.Y' The secretary checks the facts set out in the opinion
against the record to assure an absolute correspondence. All
citations and supporting authorities are carefully analyzed
and their suitability for the proposition assigned to them is
tested. Any reservations on the part of the secretary are
discussed with the judge.
Although the function of the law secretary is largely a
mechanical one, on occasion he is utilized as a sounding board
for the judge's ruminations, and at times he may offer some
constructive observation about a case and the applicable law
that will be considered and accepted by the judge. For the
most part, however, his task is merely to supply the clay out
of which his judge molds the decision.
THn CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

In practically every case and motion decided by the
Court of Appeals the judge to whom the matter has been
52
5
assigned prepares a written report. ' These confidential
memoranda are circulated to the other judges of the court
before any consultation on the case is held.
Over the years the reports have been formalized to a
marked extent. In today's court the ordinary confidential
memorandum will contain a jurisdictional statement describing the history of the litigation in the lower courts and the
basis of its appealability to the Court of Appeals, a statement
of the pertinent facts and evidence, the contentions of the
parties, the issue or issues and a discussion of the law. Every
memorandum concludes with a recommended disposition.
The length of these reports varies with the type and
complexity of the case being treated, 53 but in all cases they
50 The Bright Young Men Behind The Bench, U.S. News & World Report,

July 12, 1957, p. 45.
51 Oral reports are sometimes given in election cases and other extraordinary
appeals where a decision must be reached in a limited period of time.
They are not available for inspec52 The reports are strictly intramural.
tion by the public.
53 One report in a case involving a complicated trust question, consumed
65 printed pages. Ordinarily the reports are not longer than 15 or so pages.
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are notably thorough. Most attorneys would probably be
surprised to learn that even in cases eventually affirmed
without opinion and relegated to the obscure back pages of
the N~ew York Reports, a lengthy report adverting to and
discussing each of the points and all of the authorities cited
by counsel, is prepared.
These memoranda are carefully studied by the other
judges on the bench. If a judge receiving the report agrees
with the disposition it suggests, he will merely make a notation of his concurrence for the court consultation. If he disagrees, quite often he will make a point of discussing the
matter informally with the reporting judge before conference.
Occasionally these informal discussions will erase preliminary

doubts. If the difference of opinion is apparently irreconcilable the judge receiving the report will prepare his own

memorandum for the court-usually a brief one-stating his
disagreement. This may draw a reply memorandum from
the reporting judge. Frequently it is left unanswered until
consultation.
CONSULTATION

The decisional process of the Court of Appeals culminates
in the court consultation. It is here that the decision is
actually made. 5 Every case and every motion is passed on
in consultation where the entire bench has the opportunity
to and does in fact confer before any vote is taken or any
opinion written.
On each alternate Monday and every Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday while in session, the court sits in consultation from 10 A.M. until 1 P.M. These conferences, held
in the second floor library of the courthouse, are conducted
in strict secrecy. Aside from the seven judges only two other
persons-both confidential clerks--are present.
At about fifteen minutes before ten on the morning
of a conference, the judges begin to file into the library.
54 The confidential memoranda are kept permanently on file in the Court
of Appeals index. An elaborate and current index system is maintained to
permit the use of these reports as research aids.
5 See Crane, Minute of The Cmrt of Appeals, 278 N.Y. V, VI (1938).
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Wooden trolleys with the records, briefs and reports of all
the cases likely to be discussed have previously been placed
beside the judges' places at the conference table. The conference is conducted at a large table around which the judges'
places are arranged according to their length of service with
the court from the Chief Judge, clockwise around the table
in descending order to the junior judge.
Before each conference the judges make a final review
of the matters likely to be reached. This pre-conference
study keeps some of the judges in their chambers until well
after midnight on the evening before consultation. Others
arrive at the court as early as 7 A.M. to refresh their recollections as to the arguments and reports in the immediately
pending cases.
At ten o'clock promptly, the conference begins. Each
judge has before him a calendar of the undecided cases and
a notation of the stage of proceeding they have reached.
Before a case will be called for conference, the reporting
judge's memorandum must have been circulated and ample
time allowed for study and the submission of memoranda in
disagreement. Consequently a case may not be reached in
consultation until weeks after it has been argued. Herein
lies an important distinction between the practice of the
Court of Appeals and the practice in many other appellate
courts where conferences are held immediately or shortly
after oral argument.56 Quite plainly, under the system employed by the Court of Appeals, judges reach the decisionmaking stage much better prepared to discuss and consider
the intricacies of the cases before them than they would be
just after oral argument. In the interval between oral argument and consultation they have had the benefit of their own
independent investigation of the briefs and record, a comprehensive written analysis from a fellow judge and perhaps,
5 7
in addition, the efforts of their own law secretaries.

56 See Lewis, How the Supreme Court Reaches Decisions, N.Y. Times,

Dec. 1, 1957 (Magazine), pp. 51, 54; WIENER, op. cit. supra note 45, at 22-42.
57 The relative efficiency of the two systems has been the subject of substantial differences of opinion.

See, e.g., HUGHES, op. cit. supra note 43, at 59.
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When the case is reached on the conference calendar,
the Chief Judge starts the discussion by briefly identifying
the case and calling upon the reporting judge for comments.
The matter passes from the reporting judge clockwise around
the table. Each judge, in turn, is given an opportunity to
state his views on the case. There is no limit, other than the
discretion of the individual judges, on the time allowed for
these comments. As a matter of course they are usually kept
within workable bounds. At times, however, a judge may
consume an hour or so in discussing his position.
In some cases the feeling of the judges is unanimous
and the vote is taken with little, if any, comment or discussion. On the other hand many of the appeals generate severe
divergences of opinion and prolonged discussion. It is not
unusual for a case of this sort to be carried over from one
conference to the next-or even to several further conferences
-before discussion is finally ended and the vote taken. At
all times, however, the conference is conducted with dignity
and restraint. A former Chief Judge of the court gave this
description:
By tradition the consultations of the court are an outstanding feature
of main importance to the work. They are quite formal. The judge
to whom a case has fallen is expected to report fully upon all questions involved, and while making his report it is the duty of the Chief
Judge to see that he is not interrupted, no matter how long he may
take. When he is through, the matter then passes to the next asso-

ciate in rank who is accorded like treatment. By this method it has
been found that every man is afforded full opportunity for self-

expression and the indulgence of his own peculiar method of approach
or attack. He is not cramped or frightened or dismayed by constant
or boisterous interruption. The calmness of the discussions which
never, in my twenty-one years of experience, have exceeded parliamentary language, affords reason its proper domain. Excitement,
feelings and emotions, experience has taught us are apt to deter good
58

judgment.

s Crane, Minute of The Court of Appeals, 278 N.Y. V (1938).
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THE ASSIGNMENT AND PREPARATION OF OPINIONS

It is by its written opinions that the Court of Appeals
performs the function for which it was principally designed.
Decisions dispose of the case at hand but opinions settle the
law. The practices of the court with regard to the assignment of opinions and their actual preparation reflect its acute
awareness of the overriding importance of this aspect of the
court's work.
Opinions are not written in every decided case.59 In
those that are unanimously affirmed no opinion is filed unless some new or important question of law is involved.6 0
Although unanimous, if the decision constitutes a reversal
of the court below an explanation of the decision is usually
given. 6 1 Invariably, where there is a division of the court
in the final vote one or more opinions are filed.
In the United States Supreme Court and some other
appellate courts, opinions are assigned by the chief judge.,,
The practice is different in the Court of Appeals. In our
highest court the writer of the opinion is, unless for some
reason he defers, the judge who first casts a vote for the position to be supported by the opinion. Thus, if a case is unanimously decided and an opinion is to be written, the reporting
judge, who recommended the decision initially, will author
it. If there is a division of opinion the reporting judge necessarily will cast the first vote either for the majority or dissent
depending upon whether or not a majority of the court agreed
with his report. One of the opinions written, therefore,
either the majority or dissenting opinion, will be written by
59 In the 1958-59 court year a total of 197 opinions were written in 383
decided cases. 5 N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ANN. REP. 169 (1960). Where
no opinion is written the affirmance is not to be taken as an approval of the
reasons given below. See, e.g., Matter of Clark, 275 N.Y. 1, 9 N.E.2d 753
(1937) ; Adrico Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 250 N.Y. 29, 44, 164 N.E.
732, 735 (1928).
60 See, e.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker, 3 N.Y.2d 1, 143 N.E.2d
357, 163 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1957).
61 Drinkhouse v. Parka Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 82, 143 N.E.2d 767, 164 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1957) ; Bellizzi v. Huntley Estates, 3 N.Y.2d 112, 143 N.E.2d 802, 164 N.Y.S.2d
395 (1957).
62 HUGHES, op. cit. supra note 43, at 58-60; WIENER, op. cit. supra note 45,

at 21-45.
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the reporting judge. If he is in the majority then the dissent
will be assigned to the first judge around the conference
table who casts his vote in disagreement with the report. At
any time, other judges of the court may write concurring
opinions.
After the final vote, the writer for the majority draws
a preliminary draft of his opinion which is circulated to the
rest of the court. Frequently, this first effort will be acceptable to the other judges who have voted with the opinion
writer. At times it is not; objection may be made to the
breadth of the language or possibly to the omission of something deemed significant. Usually these problems are discussed informally in chambers and solved there. If they are
not solved a concurring opinion will probably be fied.
The writer of the dissent, his arsenal of intellectual
missiles prepared for the attack, awaits circulation of the
majority opinion. Once the majority opinion has been
studied the dissent's response is prepared. In approach and
tenor this opinion may be considerably different from the
one filed by the majority. These differences were unforgettably described in the classic treatment by Judge Cardozo:
Comparatively speaking at least, the dissenter is irresponsible. The
spokesman of the court is cautious, timid, fearful of the vivid word,
the heightened phrase. He dreams of an unworthy brood of scions,
the spawn of careless dicta, disowned by the ratio decidendi, to which
all legitimate offspring must be able to trace their lineage ....
Not

so, however, the dissenter. He has laid aside the role of the
hierophant, which he will be only too glad to resume when the chances
of war make him again the spokesman of the majority. For the
moment, he is the gladiator making a last stand against the lions. 63
On occasion the first thrusts of the gladiator cause the
lion to roar anew-in the form of a revised majority opinion.
A great deal of intellectual tugging, in further draft opinions
and conference discussion, may ensue. Sometimes out of the
tugging and exchanges eventuates a compromise in which the
majority surrenders some part of its opinion, objectionable to
63 CARDozo, Law and Literature,
CARDOZO 353 (Hall ed. 1947).
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the dissent, in exchange for the withdrawal of the dissenting
opinion. On rare occasions the result may be an unsigned
per curiam opinion. 64 More often, however, the two views
remain incompatible and final opinions on both sides are
submitted.
Once the opinions have been agreed upon, the case is
ready to be handed down. On decision days, usually
Thursday of every week that the court is in session, the Chief
Judge formally hands down to the clerk of the court a list
of the decided cases and opinions. A few weeks later these
decisions appear in the advance sheets. With very rare exceptions, once handed down, the court's connection with the
cases is ended. 65
CONCLUSION
The technique of decision-making in the Court of
Appeals, the product of a century's development, is an efficient one. In design it assures thorough study and consideration of every matter before the court by each of its
seven judges. But this system, like all human systems, must
depend for its ultimate efficacy on the people implementing
it. It has been well said that the court as an institution is
nothing more than "the lengthened shadow of many men." 66
Over the past 100 years the shadow cast by the men of
the Court of Appeals, its judges, has been a formidable
one indeed. In the main this state has been distinguished
by the eminence and integrity of the men who have comprised
the bench of its highest court. Those who know the judges
of the present court only through their opinions have some
reason to know that this tradition of excellence is being
perpetuated. Those fortunate enough to have been personally exposed to the judges themselves and to their work in
the court are unshakably confirmed in that conclusion.
64 One judge of the Court of Appeals has described this latter phenomenon
as an opinion "where we agree to pool our weaknesses." Manley, Nonpareil
Among Judges, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 50, 52 (1948).
65But see 56-70 58th Street Holding Corp. v. Fedders Quigan Corp.,
5 N.Y.2d 557, 159 N.E.2d 150, 186 N.Y.S.2d 583, reargumnent granted, 6 N.Y.2d
878, 160 N.E.2d 124, 188 N.Y.S.2d 995 (memorandum decision), aff'd men.,
7 N.Y.2d 752, 162 N.E.2d 747, 193 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1959).
66 Field, C.J., Observance of the 250th Anniversary of the Supreme Judicial

Court, 312 Mass. 746 (1942).

